Abstract-We consider the min-cost multicast problem (under network coding) with multiple correlated sources where each terminal wants to losslessly reconstruct all the sources. We study the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of the terminals in this scenario by modeling it as a noncooperative game among the terminals. The degradation in performance due to the lack of regulation is measured by the Price of Anarchy (POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible Wardrop equilibrium and the socially optimum cost. Our main result is that in contrast with the case of independent sources, the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the price of anarchy. Toward establishing this result, we first characterize the socially optimal flow and rate allocation in terms of four intuitive conditions. Next, we show that the Wardrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a different set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we
I. INTRODUCTION
I N large-scale networks such as the Internet, the agents involved in producing and transmitting information often exhibit selfish behavior, e.g., if a packet needs to traverse the network of various ISP's, each ISP will behave in a greedy manner and ensure that the packet spends the minimum time on its network. While this minimizes the ISP's cost, it may not be the best strategy from an overall network cost perspective. Selfish routing, that deals with the question of network performance under a lack of regulation has been studied extensively (see [1] and [2] ) and has developed as an area of intense research activity. However, by and large, most of these studies have considered the network traffic injected into the network at various sources to be independent. A. Ramamoorthy is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 5011 USA (e-mail: adityar@ias-tate.edu).
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From an information theoretic perspective, there is no need to consider the sources involved in the transmission to be independent. In this paper, we initiate the study of network optimization issues related to the transmission of correlated sources over a network when the agents involved are selfish. In particular, we concentrate on the problem of multicasting correlated sources over a network to different terminals, where each terminal is interested in losslessly reconstructing all the sources. We assume that the network is capable of network coding. Under this scenario, a generalization of the classical Slepian-Wolf theorem of distributed source coding [3] holds for arbitrary networks. In particular, when the network performs random linear network coding, each terminal can recover the sources under appropriate conditions on the Slepian-Wolf region and the capacity region of the terminals with respect to the sources, thereby allowing distributed source coding over networks (these conditions are discussed in detail later). The selfish agents in our setup are the terminals who pay for the resources. Each terminal aims to minimize her own cost while ensuring that she can satisfy her demands. It is important to note that this is a generalization of the problem of minimum cost selfish multicast of independent sources considered by Bhadra et al. [4] .
A. Our Results
In this paper, we model the scenario as a noncooperative game amongst the selfish terminals who request rates from sources and flows over network paths such that their individual cost is minimized (i.e., with no regard for social welfare) while allowing for reconstruction of all the sources. We investigate properties of the socially optimal solution and define appropriate solution concepts (Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium) for this game and investigate properties of the flow-rates at equilibrium. We briefly describe our contributions in the following.
1) Characterization of social-optimality conditions:
The problem of computing the socially optimal cost is a convex program. We present a precise characterization of the optimality conditions of this convex program in terms of four intuitive conditions, using Lagrangian duality theory and by judiciously exploiting the supermodularity of conditional entropy. This result is a key technical contribution of this paper and is of independent interest as well. 2) Demonstrating the equivalence of flow-rates at equilibrium with social-optimal solutions for alternative instances: We consider certain meaningful market models that split resource costs amongst the different terminals and show that the flows and rates under the game-theoretic equilibriums are, in fact, socially optimal solutions for a different set of cost functions. This characterization allows us to quantify the degradation caused by the lack of regulation. The measure of performance degradation due to such loss in regulation that we adopt is the Price of Anarchy (POA), which is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst possible equilibrium and the socially optimum cost [2] , [5] - [7] . 3) Showing that source correlation induces anarchy: The main result of this paper is that the presence of source correlations can significantly increase the POA under reasonable cost-splitting mechanisms. This is in stark contrast to the case of multicast with independent sources, where for a large class of cost functions, cost-splitting mechanisms can be designed that ensure that the price of anarchy is one. We construct explicit examples where the POA is greater than one and also obtain an upper bound on the POA which is near tight, i.e., we demonstrate an example of a network topology and a source distribution, where the POA is quite close to the derived upper bound. Finally, we expect that the techniques developed in the this paper may be applicable to a large class of network information flow problems with correlated sources where the Slepian-Wolf polytope is replaced by polymatroid-like objects. These include multiterminal source coding with high resolution [8] and the CEO problem [9] .
B. Background and Related Work
Distributed source coding (or distributed compression) (see [10, Ch.14] for an overview) considers the problem of compressing multiple discrete memoryless sources that are observing correlated random variables [8] . The landmark result of Slepian and Wolf [11] characterizes the feasible rate region for the recovery of the sources. However, the problem of Slepian and Wolf considers a direct link between the sources and the terminal. More generally, one would expect that the sources communicate with the terminal over a network. Different aspects of the Slepian-Wolf problem over networks have been considered in [12] - [17] ; for a tutorial overview, see [18] . Network coding (first introduced in the seminal work of Ahlswede et al. [19] ) for correlated sources was studied by Ho et al. [14] . They considered a network with a set of sources and a set of terminals and showed that as long as the minimum cuts between all nonempty subsets of sources and a particular terminal were sufficiently large (essentially as long as the Slepian-Wolf region of the sources has an intersection with the capacity region of a given terminal), random linear network coding over the network followed by appropriate decoding at the terminals achieves the Slepian-Wolf bounds.
The problem of minimum cost multicast under network coding has been addressed in [20] and [21] . The multicast problem has also been examined by considering selfish agents [4] , [22] , [23] . Our work is closest in spirit to the analysis of Bhadra et al. [4] that considers selfish terminals. In this scenario, for a large class of edge cost functions, they develop a pricing mechanism for allocating the edge costs among the different terminals and show that it leads to a globally optimal solution to the original optimization problem, i.e., the price of anarchy is one. Their POA analysis is similar to that in the case of selfish routing [2] , [7] . Our model is more general and our results do not generalize from theirs in a straightforward manner. In particular, we need to judiciously exploit several nontrivial properties of the Slepian-Wolf polytope in our analysis.
Furthermore, motivated by the need to deal with selfish users, particularly in network setting, there has been a large body of recent work at the intersection of networking, game theory, economics, and theoretical computer science [1] , [24] , [25] . This paper adds another interesting dimension to this interdisciplinary area.
II. MODEL
Consider a directed graph . There is a set of source nodes that may be correlated and a set of sinks that are the terminals (i.e., receivers). Each source node observes a discrete memoryless source . The Slepian-Wolf region [11] of the sources is assumed to be known and is denoted . For notational simplicity, let , , and . For the case of sources, has the following form:
where denotes the conditional entropy of the sources indexed by set given the remaining sources.
The set of paths from source to terminal is denoted by . Furthermore, define , i.e., the set of all possible paths going to terminal , and , the set of all possible paths. A flow is an assignment of nonnegative reals to each path . The flow on is denoted . A rate is a function , i.e., the rate requested by the terminal from the source is . We will refer to a flow and rate pair as flow-rate. Also, let us denote the rate vector for terminal by and the vector of requested rates at source by , i.e., and . Associated with each edge is a cost , which takes as argument a scalar variable that depends on the flows to various terminals passing through . Similarly, let be the cost function corresponding to the source , which takes as argument a scalar variable that depends on the rates that various terminals request from . These functions 's and 's are assumed to be convex, positive, differentiable, and monotonically increasing. Furthermore, the functions are also assumed to be convex, positive, differentiable, and monotonically increasing. In particular, these conditions are satisfied by functions like , and among others. The network connection we are interested in supporting is one where each terminal can reconstruct all the sources, i.e., we need to jointly allocate rates and flows for each terminal so that it can reconstruct the sources. We now present a formal description of the optimization problem under consideration.
A. Min-Cost Multicast With Multiple Sources
Let us call the quadruple an instance. The problem of minimizing the total cost for the instance can be formulated as (1) where is a function of , that we denote with , and is a function of that we will denote . Henceforth, we will refer to this optimization problem as Network Information Flow-Convex Program (NIF-CP).
The aforementioned formulation is similar to the one presented in [4] . However, since we consider source correlations as well, their formulation is a specific case of our formulation. Since network coding allows the sharing of edges, the penalty at an edge is only the maximum and not the sum, i.e., is the maximum flow (among the different terminals) across the edge . Similarly, the penalty at the sources for higher resolution quantization is also driven by the maximum level requested by each terminal, i.e., is also maximum. In this paper, for differentiability requirements, the maximum function will be approximated as norm with a large . Nevertheless, most of our analysis is done where and are nondecreasing functions partially differentiable with respect to their arguments, such that and are convex, positive, differentiable, and monotonically increasing. Note that in the aforementioned formulation, the objective function is convex and all constraints are linear which implies that this is a convex optimization problem.
The aforementioned constraint (1) models the fact that the total flow from the source to a terminal needs to be at least . The next constraint enforces the rate point of each terminal to be within the Slepian-Wolf polytope. A flow-rate satisfying all the conditions in the aforementioned optimization problem (i.e., (NIF-CP)) will be called a feasible flow-rate for the instance and the cost will be referred to as the social cost corresponding to this flow-rate. Also, we will call a solution of the aforementioned problem as an OPT flow-rate for the instance . Consider a feasible flow-rate for the aforementioned optimization problem. It can be seen that the value of the flow from to a terminal is . Since , the result of [14] (see also [15] , [26] ) shows that random linear network coding followed by appropriate decoding at the terminals can recover the sources with high probability. Conversely, the result in [12] and [27] shows the necessity of the existence of such a flow.
B. Terminals' Incentives and the Distributed Compression Game (DCG)
The aforementioned formulation for social cost minimization for the instance disregards the fact that the agents who pay for the costs incurred at the edges and the sources may not be cooperative and may have incentives for strategic manipulation. In this paper, we consider the scenario where the terminals pay for the network resources they are being provided. The terminals are noncooperative and will behave selfishly trying to minimize their own respective costs without regard to the social cost, while ensuring that they can reconstruct all the sources. We have the following assumptions. 1) Let denote a feasible flow-rate for the instance . The network operates via random linear network coding (or some practical linear network coding scheme) over the subgraph of induced by the corresponding for . The terminals are capable of performing appropriate decoding to recover the sources. 2) Each terminal can request for any specific set of flows on the paths and rates as long as such a request allows reconstruction of the sources at . There is a mechanism in the network by means of which this request is accommodated, i.e., the subgraph over which random linear network coding is performed is adjusted appropriately. In this paper, we wish to characterize flow-rates that represent an equilibrium among selfish terminals who act strategically to minimize their own costs. Furthermore, we shall systematically study the loss that occurs due to the mismatch between the social goals and terminal's selfish goals.
Toward this end, we now formally model the game originating from the selfish behavior of the terminals. We model this game as a normal form game or strategic game [28] , which we refer to as the DCG.
A normal form game, denoted , consists of the set of players , the tuple of set of strategies for each player , and the tuple of preference relations for each player on the set . For , means that the player prefers the tuple of strategies to the tuple of strategies . In the context of DCG, given an instance , these parameters are defined as follows.
1) Distributed Compression Game (DCG):
• Players: , i.e., the terminals are the players. This is because, as aforementioned, the terminals are the users and they are the ones who pay for the network resources they are being provided.
• Strategies: The strategy set of a player consists of tuples where -is the vector of flows on paths going to , i.e., the vector of values for all , and recall that denotes the rate vector for terminal ; -and . Therefore (2) Note that a feasible flow-rate for the instance is an element of the set defined for the same instance.
• Preference Relations: To specify the preference relation of terminal , we need to know how much does she pay given a feasible flow-rate , i.e., what fractions of the costs at various edges and sources are being paid by ? To this end, we need market models, i.e., mechanisms for splitting the costs among various terminals. -Edge Costs: At a flow , the cost of an edge is . It is split among the terminals , each paying a fraction of this cost. Let us say that the fraction paid by the player is , i.e., the player pays for the edge where denotes the vector . Of course, to ensure that the total cost is borne by someone or the other. The total cost borne by across all the edges is , denoted . -Source Costs: At a rate , the cost for the source is , which is split among the terminals , such that pays a fraction , i.e., the player pays for the source . Of course,
. Therefore, the total cost borne by for all sources, denoted , is . Thus, with the edge-cost-splitting mechanism and the source-cost-splitting mechanism , the total cost incurred by the player at flow-rate denoted is Now, each terminal would like to minimize its own cost, i.e., the function , and therefore, the preference relations are as follows. For two flow-rates and , if and only if . Also, iff . Note that for specifying a DCG, in addition to the parameters , and , we also need the cost-splitting mechanisms and . We will call as an instance of the DCG.
2) Solution Concepts for the DCG:
We now outline the possible solution concepts in our scenario. These are essentially dictated by the level of sophistication of the terminals. Sophistication refers to the amount of information and computational resources available to a terminal. In this paper, we shall work with two different solution concepts that we now discuss. a) Nash Equilibrium. The solution concept of Nash equilibrium requires the complete information setting and requires each terminal to compute her best response to any given tuple of strategies of the other players. For notational simplicity, let be the vector of flows on paths not going to terminal , i.e., the vector of values for all ; therefore, . Similarly, is the vector of rates corresponding to all players other than ; therefore, . In our setting, the best response problem of a terminal is to minimize her cost function over given any . Therefore, a Nash flow-rate is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Flow-Rate): A flow-rate feasible for the instance is at Nash equilibrium, or is a Nash flow-rate for instance , if
We note that computing the best response will, in general, require a given terminal to know flow assignments on all possible paths and rate vectors for all the terminals. Moreover, convexity of the objective function in NIF-CP (i.e., social cost ) does not imply convexity of in the variables in general. Therefore, the computational requirements at the terminals may be large. Consequently, Nash equilibrium does not seem to be an appropriate solution concept for the DCG when viewed through the algorithmic lens.
b) Wardrop Equilibrium. From a practical standpoint, a terminal may only have partial knowledge of the system and may be computationally constrained. A solution concept more appropriate under such situations is that of local Nash equilibrium or Wardrop equilibrium that is widely adopted in selfish routing and transportation literature [2] , [29] , [30] . We note that this solution concept has also been utilized in [4] and is further justified in [31] . We first present the precise definition of the Wardrop equilibrium in our case and then provide an intuitive justification. Toward this end, we need to define the marginal cost of a path.
Definition 2 (Marginal Cost of a Path): For a its marginal cost is
Therefore, for the terminal , the total cost for the edges, , can be equivalently written as (1) and (2) require that each terminal requests as little rate and flow as possible. Condition (3) ensures that an infinitesimally small change in flow allocations from path (where ) to path where , will increase the sum cost along paths in . Now, consider an infinitesimally small change in flow allocation from (where ) to . This also requires a corresponding change in the rates requested from sources and by terminal . Under certain constraints on the source , condition (4) ensures that the overall effect of this change will serve to increase terminal 's cost. The conditions on the source are well motivated in light of the characterization of Nash flow-rate in Section V in the case when the best response problem of every terminal is convex.
We remark that a Nash flow-rate may not always be a Wardrop flow-rate and vice versa. When sources are independent, condition (2) implies that for all and it is not required to check the condition (4). Also, we can recover condition (3) by setting in condition (4). They are stated separately for the sake of clarity.
As we discussed earlier, the solution concept based on Wardrop equilibrium seems more suitable to our scenario, and consequently, we define the price of anarchy [2] , [5] , [6] in terms of Wardrop flow-rate instead of Nash flow-rate.
Definition 4 Price of Anarchy (POA):
Let be a class of edge cost functions, be a class of source cost functions, be a class of networks/graphs, be an edge cost splitting mechanism, be a source cost splitting mechanism, and be a set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes. We will refer to as a scenario. The price of anarchy for the scenario , denoted , is defined as maximum over all instances with , of the ratio between the cost of worst possible Wardrop flow-rate for the instance and the cost of OPT flow-rate (i.e., the socially optimal cost) for the instance . That is where refers to the optimal cost of NIF-CP for the instance . Let us denote the set of Slepian-Wolf polytopes corresponding to the case where there are no source correlations 1 We use H(X jX ) and H(X jX ) interchangeably in the text to denote the joint entropy of the sources in set A given the remaining sources. , which is a contradiction. The aforementioned argument shows that there exists some such that all inequalities in which participates are loose. Therefore, we can reduce to a new value until one of the inequalities in which it participates is tight. If the sum-rate constraint is met with equality, then we can set otherwise we can recursively apply the aforementioned procedure to arrive at a new vector that is component-wise smaller that the original vector .
IV. CHARACTERIZING THE OPTIMAL FLOWS AND RATES
In this section, we investigate the properties of an OPT flowrate via Lagrangian duality theory [32] . Since the optimization problem NIF-CP is convex and the constraints are such that the strong duality holds, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions exactly characterize optimality [32] . Therefore, we start out by writing the Lagrangian dual of NIF-CP where and are the dual variables (i.e., Lagrange multipliers). For notational simplicity, let us denote the partial derivative of with respect to , by . Note that the partial derivative of w.r.t. to is 1 for a path such that . Similarly, we denote the partial derivative of with respect to , by . The KKT conditions are then given by the following equations that hold :
along with the feasibility of the flow-rate and the complementary slackness conditions, for all , for all , and for all . Let us now interpret the KKT conditions at the OPT flow-rate . Suppose that for . Then due to complementary slackness, we have and consequently from (3) we get , i.e., if there exists another path such that , then . Now, if we interpret the quantity as the differential cost of the path associated with the flow-rate then this condition implies that the differential cost of all the paths going from the same source to the same terminal with positive flows at OPT is the same. It is quite intuitive for if it were not true the objective function could be further decreased by moving some flow from a higher differential cost path to a lower differential cost one without violating feasibility conditions, and, of course, this should not be possible at the optimum. Similarly, the differential cost along a path with zero flow at OPT must have higher differential cost and indeed this can be obtained as earlier by further noting that the dual variables 's are nonnegative. We note this property of the OPT flow-rate in the following lemma.
Lemma 7:
Let be an OPT flow-rate for the instance . Then, , with we have
The aforementioned lemma provides a simple and intuitive characterization of how the flow allocations on various paths of same type (that is originating at same source and ending at the same terminal) behave at the optimum solution. Although such a simple and intuitive characterization of the behavior of joint flow and rate allocations at optimum is not immediately clear, we can indeed obtain three other simple and intuitive conditions that together with Lemma 7, are equivalent to the KKT conditions. We establish this important characterization in the Theorem 11. First, we will show in the next three lemmas that these conditions are necessary for optimality. Proof: We prove that the aforementioned four conditions imply optimality of . Our assumptions guarantee that the optimization problem NIF-CP for the instance is convex and since all the feasibility constraints are linear, strong duality holds [32] . This implies that the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. We show that a feasible flow-rate with the aforementioned four properties satisfies the KKT conditions for the instance for a suitable choice of the dual variables given in the following. Choosing 's:
Note that, using 
Corollary 12:
If the sources are independent (i.e., ), there is a feasible flow-rate for instance that is an OPT flow-rate for both the instances and , where for constant , and is any convex, differentiable, positive, and nondecreasing function. Furthermore, this OPT flow-rate satisfies the four conditions in Theorem 11 for both the instances and . Proof: The idea is that when the sources are independent, Condition (2) in Theorem 11 implies that for all , and therefore, there is no pair such that participates in all tight rate inequalities involving , and consequently, it is not required to check Condition (4). For the sake of completeness, the proof follows.
Let be an OPT flow-rate for satisfying the four conditions in Theorem 11. Note that such an OPT flowrate always exists as per Theorem 11. Since the sources are independent, the rate inequalities constraints becomes Therefore, using Condition (2) in Theorem 11, we obtain Now, we will show that is also an OPT flow-rate for the instance by showing that it satisfies the four conditions in Theorem 11 for instance . Note that Conditions (1) and (2) are easily satisfied by as they do not depend on particular cost functions. Furthermore therefore condition is equivalent to therefore condition (3) is also satisfied. For the condition (4), let us first note that as discussed earlier for all . This implies that there is no pair satisfying the promise in condition (4), i.e., there is no pair such that participates in all tight rate inequalities involving (simply because does not participate in the tight rate inequality ). Thus, satisfies all the four conditions in Theorem 11 for the instance and, hence, is an OPT flow-rate for .
V. FLOWS AND RATES AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the properties of a Nash flow-rate whenever the individual optimization problem (i.e., the best response problem) of each terminal is convex, that is whenever Nash equilibrium can be considered as an appropriate solution concept for the DCG when viewed through the algorithmic lens. Therefore, throughout this section, we assume that the edge cost splitting mechanism , as well as, the source cost splitting mechanism are such that the functions , for all , are convex. By considering the best response problem of each terminal, and an approach essentially the same as in the Section IV for characterizing OPT flow-rate, we can obtain the following Theorem 13 for characterizing Nash flow-rate. Furthermore, under similar convexity conditions, we can also show that a Nash flow-rate always exists for the DCG This is done via first compactifying the strategy sets 's to obtain a restricted game where existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from the standard fixed point theorems [28] . Then, by utilizing the monotonically nondecreasing properties of various cost functions, it is argued that a Nash equilibrium of the restricted game is also a Nash flow-rate for our DCG thereby proving the existence of a Nash flow-rate for DCG.
The result stated in the following (Theorem 14) is a standard result on the existence of Nash equilibrium and can be found, for instance in the book by Osborne and Rubinstein [28] .
Theorem 14:
The strategic game has a Nash equilibrium if for all , the following conditions hold. 1) The set of actions of player is a nonempty compact convex subset of a Euclidean space.
2) The preference relation is continuous and quasi-concave on . A preference relation on is said to be quasi-concave on if for every , the set is convex. A preference relation on is said to be continuous if whenever there are sequences and with and for all such that and converge to and , respectively. Now, let us consider an instance of the DCG, where is convex for all . The action set of the terminal is (5) Clearly, this is a nonempty convex subset of an Euclidean Space, but it is not compact.
Let us consider a game with a restricted set of strategies denoted 's as follows and let us call this new game as the restricted game for the instance (6) Now, the set becomes compact as it is a closed and bounded subset of an Euclidean space, and therefore, satisfies the requirement of the Theorem 14. Since players' cost functions are convex and continuous for all , the condition in the Theorem 14 is also satisfied and we obtain the following result.
Lemma 15:
The restricted game for the instance , where is convex for all , admits a Nash equilibrium. Now, we claim that every Nash equilibrium of the restricted game is also a Nash equilibrium for the original game and that will imply the existence of a Nash flow-rate for the original game.
Lemma 16: Every Nash equilibrium of the restricted game for the instance , where is convex for all , is also a Nash flow-rate for the instance . Proof: Let be a Nash equilibrium of the restricted game for the instance . Then, for all , we have for all feasible for the restricted game, i.e., coming from the restricted strategy set . Now, let , i.e., is feasible for the original game but not feasible for the restricted game. For ease of notation, let us define the following quantities:
Note that in defining and , we have projected all the flows and rates violating the feasibility for the restricted game to their boundary values and, therefore, the strategy , i.e., it is feasible for the restricted game. Now and since is a Nash equilibrium for the restricted game and is feasible for the restricted game, we have and therefore for all implying that is a Nash equilibrium of the original game meaning is a Nash flow-rate for the instance .
Combining the Lemmas 15 and 16, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 17: An instance
, where is convex for all , admits a Nash flow-rate.
VI. WARDROP FLOW-RATE AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section, we investigate the inefficiency brought forth by the selfish behavior of terminals. First, we will show that the Wardrop equilibrium is a socially optimal solution for a different set of (related) cost functions. Using this, we will construct explicit examples that demonstrate that the POA and determine near-tight upper bounds on the POA as well. We start out with the characterization of Wardrop flow-rate. Therefore where the last equality follows from the fact that Also Therefore
The result follows from the equivalence of conditions coming from Definition 3 and Theorem 11.
In contrast with the result of [4] that holds for a single source with the edge cost splitting mechanism used earlier, from Theorem 18, we can note that for most reasonable cost splitting mechanisms, the POA will not equal one for all monomial edge cost functions. We construct explicit examples for POA in Figs. 1 and 2 . The example in Fig. 1 is near tight as will be evident from an upper bound on POA derived in Theorem 20.
It is interesting to note that in the case when sources are independent, in the Wardrop or OPT solutions, the rates requested at various sources will equal their respective lower bounds (i.e., their entropies). Therefore, the cost term corresponding to the sources will be fixed, and one only needs to find flows that minimize the edge costs. In this situation, it is not hard to see that the POA will again equal one for all monomial edge cost functions. This means that it is the correlation among the sources that is responsible for bringing more anarchy. We formalize this as follows.
Let be the set of edge cost functions where all edge cost functions are monomial of the same degree possibly with different coefficients, and . Similarly, . Also, let . In particular Now, take , and note that as well as Therefore, we get This is near tight as will be evident from Theorem 20.
To establish (4), we will prove a stronger result, , by constructing an example as described in the following. As shown in Fig. 2 Note that while constructing the aforementioned examples, the source cost splitting function we have used is . Furthermore, for the same mechanism, Corollary 19 (2) provides an example of edge cost functions that gives a POA of one, and possibly this is the only choice giving POA one. Before considering another reasonable splitting mechanism, we first establish an upper bound which is nearly attainable by instance given in Fig. 1 . (2) in the definition of Wardrop flow-rate as well as OPT flow-rate renders all the rates to be equal to their corresponding entropies, and consequently, the condition (4) need not be checked.
Lemma 21:
Let ,
, and be any source cost splitting function; then, we have Now, we will argue that with and , we have for large values of and . Let us consider the same example as in Fig. 2 but with the new source cost splitting mechanism. First, note that OPT flow-rate is independent of the choice of cost splitting functions and the previously calculated OPT flow-rate for this instance is given by
We will argue that this is not a Wardrop flow-rate and since the OPT flow-rate is unique (by strict convexity), we will obtain . After some simple calculations, we get for large values of and ; then, we have VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS In this paper, we have initiated a study of the inefficiency brought forth by the lack of regulation in the multicast of multiple correlated sources. We have established the foundations of the framework by providing the first set of technical results that characterize the equilibrium among terminals, when they act selfishly trying to minimize their individual costs without any regard to social welfare, and its relation to the socially optimal solution. Our paper leaves out several open problems that we discuss as follows.
Network Information Flow Games: From Slepian-Wolf to Polymatroids: The results presented in this paper are expected to naturally extend to a large class of network information flow problems where the entropy is replaced by any rank function [33] and equivalently conditional entropy is replaced by any supermodular function. This is because the only special property of conditional entropy used in our analysis is its supermodularity. Polytopes described by such rank functions are called contra-polymatroids and the SW polytope is an example. Therefore, by abstracting the network coding scenario to this more general setting, we can obtain a nice class of multiplayer games with compact representations.
Dynamics of Wardrop Flow-Rate: Can we design a noncooperative decentralized algorithm that steers flows and rates in way that converges to a Wardrop flow-rate? What about such an algorithm which runs in polynomial time? A first approach could be to consider an algorithm where each terminal greedily allocates rates and flows by calculating marginal costs at each step.
Better Bounds on POA: Although we have provided explicit examples where correlation brings more anarchy, as well as, an upper bound on POA which is nearly achievable, we believe that more detailed analysis is necessary. An important approach in this direction would be to characterize exactly how the POA depends on structure of SW region, i.e., to analyze the finer details on how correlation among the sources changes the POA, even in the case of two sources. Furthermore, other interesting splitting mechanisms can also be studied.
Capacity Constraints and Approximate Wardrop Flow-Rates: Another direction of investigation could be to consider the scenario where there is a capacity constraint on each edge, i.e., the maximum amount of flow that can be sent through that edge. It may also be useful to investigate the sensitivity of the implicit assumption in our analysis that terminals can evaluate various quantities, and in particular the marginal costs, with arbitrary precision. This can be approached by formulating a notion of approximate Wardrop flow-rate, where terminals can distinguish quantities only when they differ significantly.
